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COMMENT
THE COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE
ACT: REASSESSING THE DAMAGE
REQUIREMENT
MATTHEW ANDRIS*
I. INTRODUCTION
An elected village commissioner logged on to her official e-mail and
discovered that a village employee had been forwarding her correspondence with her constituents to the mayor, her political rival.1 She
surmised that a village information technology employee was responsible.2 This e-mail forwarding hurt the village commissioner because she
had challenged the mayor for his seat in the prior election.3 As a result
of local media coverage, the mayor denied any involvement with the forwarding of the e-mails.4 The village commissioner brought suit in federal court claiming, among other things, a violation of the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”).5
The village commissioner felt she had been damaged by the unauthorized access of her e-mail account. However, no actual physical damage was done to her computer, nor did she suffer any measurable
monetary loss as a result of the intrusion. In order to recover, she should
not have to prove that she suffered actual measurable damages as a result of the unauthorized access to her computer. This comment will ex* J.D. Candidate, 2012, The John Marshall Law School. A special thank you to Kate
Croteau for her support and patience and thank you to Professor Mary Nagel for her
assistance.
1. Steinbach v. Vill. of Forest Park, No. 06-C-4215, 2009 WL 2605283 at *1 (N.D. Ill.
Aug. 25, 2009). These are the facts as alleged by the plaintiff, Theresa Steinbach against
the Village of Forest Park, information services employee Craig Lundt, and village mayor
Anthony Calderone. Id.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at *2.
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plore whether a civil plaintiff needs to claim actual damage to a
protected computer to recover against a defendant under the CFAA.
Several courts have noted that there is little case law regarding
damages, and the case law that exists does not help define the reach of
damages.6 Currently, courts are split as to whether a computer system
needs to have actual physical damage in order for recovery under the
CFAA. Additionally, courts have not adequately addressed how to assess
damages, including whether damages may be aggregated across multiple
computer systems. The Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals have held that plaintiffs do not need to show damage to a protected
computer in order to recover under the CFAA.7 However, the Seventh
Circuit has stated that a litigant can only state a cause of action if there
has been measurable damage to a protected computer.8 This is a significant issue because, under the CFAA, specific criteria are used to show
what constitutes a “protected computer.”9
If the act requires a showing of actual damages to a protected computer, then civil litigants will be seriously limited in their ability to bring
a cause of action. Issues also arise when multiple computers across a
network are affected and damage to each individual computer does not
reach the statutory minimum proscribed in the CFAA.10 Litigants
should be able to aggregate damages across multiple protected computers within an affected network.
This comment will argue that showing actual damages to a protected computer should not be required for a civil litigant to state a claim
under the CFAA. Additionally, this comment will argue that damages
should be aggregated across multiple protected computers to reach the
jurisdictional damage amount. Furthermore, this comment will discuss
how the courts have not sufficiently analyzed the CFAA.
Section II will discuss the background and history of the CFAA, including the present state of the Act, amendments to the Act, and current
6. See EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 584 (1st Cir. 2001).
7. Fiber Sys. Int’l, Inc. v. Roehrs, 470 F.3d 1150, 1157 (5th Cir. 2006); P.C. Yonkers,
Inc. v. Celebrations the Party & Seasonal Superstore, LLC, 428 F.3d 504, 511-12 (3d Cir.
2005); Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1078 n. 3 (9th Cir. 2004).
8. See Kathrein v. McGrath, 166 Fed. Appx. 858, 863 n. 2 (7th Cir. 2006).
9. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4) (2008). The term protected computer as defined by section
1030(e)(2) is a computer used:
Exclusively for the use of a financial institution or the United States Government,
or, in the case of a computer not exclusively for such use, used by or for a financial
institution or the United States Government and the conduct constituting the offense affects that use by or for the financial institution or the Government; or
which is used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communication,
including a computer located outside the United States that is used in a manner
that affects interstate or foreign commerce or communication of the United States.
Id. at 1030(e)(2).
10. See In re Doubleclick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
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jurisprudence surrounding the Act. Section III will analyze the term
“protected computer,” the aggregation of damages, and what constitutes
damages under the CFAA. Finally, Section IV will propose that the
courts should liberally construe the term “protected computer” and find
that a plaintiff need not show specific damages in order to recover under
the CFAA.
Additionally, this comment will propose an amendment to the CFAA
to clarify ambiguous language in the statute. The term, “protected computer,” is far too narrow to protect potential victims if their computer
systems are damaged. Furthermore, as will be demonstrated, current
jurisprudence is varied and contradictory in defining how damages can
be aggregated to meet the statutory minimum. Civil litigants need an
avenue that provides them with the ability to pursue a cause of action
against an alleged violator.
II. BACKGROUND
A. CURRENT STATE

OF THE

COMPUTER FRAUD

AND

ABUSE ACT

The CFAA has two components: a criminal penalty against those
who violate it, as well as a civil remedy for those who may have been
damaged by the violator.11 In order to recover civilly, a plaintiff must
show that the defendant accessed a protected computer without authorization and caused damages aggregating at least $5,000.12 Generally, a
protected computer is defined as a computer that is “used exclusively for
the use of a financial institution of the United States” or “is used in or
affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communication.”13 Recovery
under the CFAA can be very broad; however, Congress intended that the
$5,000 damage threshold must be met, regardless of how a court may
construe the terms “damage” and “loss.”14
The statute defines loss as “any reasonable cost to any victim, including the cost of responding to an offense, conducting a damage assessment, and restoring the data, program, system, or information to its
condition prior to the offense, and any revenue lost, cost incurred, or
other consequential damages incurred because of interruption of service.”15 Additionally, a Senate Report released in 1996 on the CFAA
makes clear that Congress intended the term “loss” to account for addi11. Bradley C. Nahrstadt, Delete at Your Own Risk: Application of the Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030, ILL. BUS. L. J. 3 (May 6, 2006), available at http://www.
iblsjournal.typepad.com/illinois_business_law_soc/2006/05_delete_at_your_1.htmls.
12. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4).
13. Id. at § 1030(e)(2)(a)(4).
14. EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F. 3d 577, 585 (1st Cir. 2001).
15. Forge Indus. Staffing, Inc. v. De La Fuente, No. 06 C 3848, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
75286 at *19 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 16, 2006).
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tional lesser damages that could not be counted towards direct damage
to an information system.16 “Loss” is not meant to except certain injuries from the $5,000 damages threshold.17
Civil actions can be maintained for some, but not all of the CFAA’s
provisions.18 A civil litigant must prove a two-part injury requirement
in order to recover: there must be an underlying injury and a violation of
one of the five statutory effects.19 A person can pursue civil remedies if
there was a loss to one or more computers aggregating $5,000 in damages, the modification or impairment of medical treatment, physical injury, a threat to public safety, or damage to a United States computer
used for national defense or national security.20 Legislative history
states that although a victim may not suffer damage, they can still suffer
loss. If the victim’s loss meets the monetary minimum in the CFAA,
then the victim is entitled to relief.21 Under the CFAA, damages and
losses can only be aggregated across victims for a single act.22 This can
be deduced from the statute from the way that section 1030(e)(8)(A) is
phrased.23 The section states, “any impairment to the integrity or availability of data, a program, a system or information that causes loss.”24
The statute places the damages required in the singular tense, not in the
plural.25 However, a criminal prosecution under the CFAA is not required in order for a successful civil suit. A civil litigant can only use
certain portions of the CFAA to recover against a defendant.
16. In re Doubleclick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 522 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
17. Id.
18. Fiber Sys. Int’l v. Roehrs, 470 F. 3d. 1150, 1157 (5th Cir. 2006). “Civil actions are
authorized for some, but not all, violations of Section 1030’s substantive provisions.” Id.
19. ResDev, LLC v. Lot Builders Ass’n, Inc., No. 6:04-cv-1374-Orl-31DAB, 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 19099 at *9 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 10, 2005). “The CFAA’s private cause of action is
principally defined by a two-part injury requirement; a plaintiff must suffer a certain type
of root injury, which is not sufficient to support a civil action, unless one of the five operatively substantial effects occur.” Id.
20. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2008).
21. S. REP. NO. 104-357, at 11 (1996). The report states that intruders often times
alter computer log in programs, which allows hackers the ability to access a computer system. Id. The hacker then retrieves the stolen password. After he retrieves the password
he restores the log in protocol to its original setting. Id. The report states that in this
scenario no damage has been done to the computer system, yet the owners still suffer loss.
Id. Loss is suffered because the owner has to spend time re-securing the system. Id.
22. In re Doubleclick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 523.
25. Id. According to the Court in Doubleclick, the legislative history supports this contention. Id. By using ‘one or more others,’ the Committee intends to make clear that losses
caused by the same act may be aggregated for the purpose of meeting the [then] $1,000
threshold.” Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 99-132).
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Congress initially passed the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act in
1984.26 The CFAA was the first comprehensive federal law aimed at
computer crime.27 Prior to the passage of the CFAA, Congress primarily
relied on mail and wire fraud statutes in order to regulate crimes committed against computers.28 As these crimes grew more sophisticated in
nature, the wire and mail fraud statutes proved to be inadequate for
crimes that did not involve interstate commerce.29 Initially, the law was
a criminal statute meant to protect computers owned by government and
financial institutions.30
The first incarnation of the bill was meant to protect government
computers that contained classified government information, government credit information, and financial sector information.31 The Act was
meant to protect against hackers and people who wished to damage and
take advantage of computer systems.32 The Act was intended to regulate interstate computer crime.33 However, since the proliferation of the
Internet, almost any computer could be considered interstate in character.34 After the passage of the Act, its scope has been expanded dramatically.35 With increased frequency, employers are using the CFAA to sue
former employees who wrongfully seek information to achieve a competitive edge in the work place.36
26. Reid Skibell, Comment, Cybercrimes & Misdemeanors: A Reevaluation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 909, 912 (Summer 2003).
27. Megan M. LaBelle, Working Together in a Digital World: An Introduction: The
“Rootkit Debacle:” The Latest Chapter in the Story of the Recording Industry and the War on
Music Piracy, 84 DENV. U.L. REV. 79, 102 (2006).
28. Shaw v. Toshiba Am. Info. Sys., 91 F. Supp. 2d 926, 930 (E.D. Tex. 1999).
29. Id.
30. Graham M. Liccardi, Comment, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: A Vehicle for
Litigating Trade Secrets in Federal Court, 8 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 155, 158
(Fall 2008).
31. Shurgard Storage Centers Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121,
1126 (W.D. Wash. 2000). In Shurgard, the plaintiff owned self storage facilities. Id. As
part of their business plan they had sophisticated marketing and computer software that
was used to help further their business. Id. The defendant was also in the self storage
business. Id. An employee of the plaintiff was working as an agent for the defendant. Id.
In this capacity, the agent was funneling confidential information to the defendant via email. Id.
32. S. REP. NO. 101-544, at 3 (1990). “But [national and international computer networks] also provide a window of vulnerability that can be exploited by those who seek to
abuse and undermine our computer systems.” Id.
33. Shurgard, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 1126.
34. Id.
35. In re Doubleclick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
36. Id.
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C. THE 1986 AMENDMENTS
After its passage, the Act was widely criticized as being too vague
and too narrow.37 In fact, Congress itself noted the deficiencies located
within the CFAA.38 In response to criticism, Congress amended the
CFAA in 1986.39 The overarching goal of the 1986 amendments to the
CFAA was to draw a distinction between mere trespass and acts that
caused more harm.40 Additionally, the amendments created a hacking
offense that was designed to punish those who altered the computer data
of others.41 Subsequent to the 1986 Amendments, Congress has
amended the CFAA an additional eight times.42
D. THE 1990 AMENDMENTS
Congress enacted the 1990 amendments to strengthen the CFAA as
technology was rapidly progressing.43 The 1990 CFAA amendments also
greatly broadened the jurisdictional reaches of the Act. Under the 1990
amendments, the Act protected against computer abuses that have significant effects on interstate and foreign commerce.44
Congress had discussed creating a civil cause of action under the
CFAA. A 1990 Senate Report stated that the proposed civil remedies
under the Act “would create a civil cause of action for those who suffer
violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.”45 In the 1990 Senate
Report, all injuries were considered violations subject to the statutory
minimum damage threshold, not just damages as defined by the statute.46 A different Senate Report stated, “[t]he Committee intends to
make clear that losses caused by the same act may be aggregated for the
purposes of meeting the [then] $1,000 threshold.”47 There has been
much discussion as to what damage is and what amount of damage is
needed in order to recover under the CFAA.
37. Skibell, supra note 26, at 912.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. S. REP. NO. 101-544, at 2 (1990). Senator Humphrey stated “[t]he national and
international computer networks, which allow the rapid exchange of information and ideas
provide one of the great benefits of modern computer technology.” Id. at 3.
44. S. REP. NO. 101-544, at 56 (1990). “The bill broadens jurisdiction for newly created
sections of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, to cover all computers used in interstate
commerce and communication.” Id. at 6.
45. S. REP. NO. 101-544, at 10 (1990).
46. In re Doubleclick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 522 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
47. Id.

\\server05\productn\S\SFT\27-2\SFT204.txt

2009]

unknown

Seq: 7

COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT

1-JUL-10

9:39

285

E. THE 1994 AMENDMENTS
The 1994 amendments to the CFAA created civil remedies available
to litigants.48 The civil remedies portion was added to the statute as
Section 1030(g).49 Section 1030(g) allows any person who suffers a loss
under sub-clauses I-V of subsection (c)(4)(A)(i) to bring an action for injunctive relief and damages.50 A 1996 Senate report on the CFAA acknowledged the Act’s shortcomings. The Senate report stated that gaps
still existed because the Act did not cover damage to civilian or state
owned computers.51 Furthermore, damages for unauthorized access of
information of non-classified information only extended to computers
owned by financial institutions.52 The CFAA has been amended by Congress in part to correct deficiencies and in part to keep the law current
with the advancement of technology.
Some of the CFAA’s amendments have dealt directly with the definitions of “damage” and “loss.” In 1994, Congress defined damages in two
ways: any impairment to the integrity or availability to a system and any
way in which the Act prohibited.53 Damages are limited to those that
are economic in scope, unless the defendant intentionally or recklessly
damaged a computer.54 However, some courts struggled with how to accurately define “integrity” within the scope of the Act.55
48. Thurmond v. Compaq Computer Corp., 171 F. Supp. 2d. 667, 675 (E.D. Tex. 2001).
“In 1994, Congress amended the CFAA and created a private right of action similar to that
in section 1964(c) of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act,” thus, adding
a civil remedy to a criminal statute. Id. at 675.
49. Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Speed, No. 6:05-cv-1580-Orl-31KRS, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 53108, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 1, 2006). “Any person who suffers damage or loss by
reason of a violation of this section may maintain a civil action against the violator.” Id. at
*7.
50. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g). A cause of action for civil damages can be brought if:
(I) loss to 1 or more persons during any 1-year period (and for purposes of an investigation, prosecution, or other proceeding brought by the United States only, loss
resulting for a related course of conduct affecting 1 or more other protected computers), (II) the modification or impairment, or potential modification or impairment, of medical examination, diagnosis, treatment, or care of 1 or more
individuals; (III) physical injury to any person; (IV) a threat to public health or
safety; (V) damage affecting computer used by or for an entity of the United States
Government in furtherance of the administration of justice, national defense, or
national security. Id. at (c)(4)(A)(i)(I-V).
51. S. REP. NO. 104-357, at 4 (1996).
52. Id.
53. Skibell, supra note 26, at 915. Skibell states, “Congress intentionally refrained
from making a list of prohibited actions to avoid being under-inclusive.” Id. at 915.
54. S. REP. NO. 104-357, at 12 (1996). “Damages are limited to economic damages,
unless the defendant. . .intentionally caused damage, or recklessly caused damage while
trespassing in a computer.” Id. at 12.
55. World Span L.P. v. Orbitz L.L.C., No. 05 C 5386, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26153, at
*14 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 19, 2006). “The CFAA does not define ‘integrity,’ but the dictionary
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F. THE 1996 AMENDMENTS
From the time of the CFAA’s inception, Congress has consistently
broadened the reach and terms of the Act. Congress was aware that the
CFAA would have to be expanded as technology evolved, because at its
beginnings the Act dealt with computer crime generally.56 The 1996
amendments to the CFAA added the term “protected computer,” which
replaced the term “federal interest computer.”57 As technology progresses, the circumstances under which a computer will suffer actual
physical damage will likely be less than the amount of money companies
will spend in order to recover from an attack, as well as the cost of securing computers against continued attempted virtual assaults by hackers.58 A Senate report on the CFAA stated that the Act needed to be
sufficiently broad in order to anticipate developments in computers and
technology.59
G. THE 2001 AMENDMENTS
The CFAA was amended again in 2001 to include, among other
changes, the term “loss” in the discussion of damages.60 In the 2001 version of the CFAA, “loss” includes costs to the victim associated with the
violation by the offender.61 More broadly, loss is defined as any reasonadefinition is ‘an unimpaired or unmarred condition: entire correspondence with an original
condition: soundness.’ ” Id. at *14.
56. United States v. Middleton, 231 F.3d 1207, 1212 (9th Cir. 2000). This case cited a
Senate report on the CFAA stating: “[a]s computers continue to proliferate in businesses
and homes, and new forms of computer crime emerge, Congress must remain vigilant to
ensure that the Computer Fraud and Abuse statute is up to date and provides law enforcement with the necessary legal framework to fight computer crime.” Id. at 1212.
57. Shurgard Storage Centers Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121,
1128 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
58. See EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 585 (1st Cir. 2001).
59. S. REP. NO. 104-357, at 11 (1996). “As the NII system. . .continues to grow, computers will increasingly be used for access to critical services. . .and will be critical to other
systems which we cannot yet anticipate. Thus, the definition of “damage” is amended to be
sufficiently broad to encompass the types of harm against which people should be protected.” Id. at 11.
60. Creative Computing v. Getloaded L.L.C., 386 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2004). In
Creative Computing, Getloaded attempted through several avenues, including hacking, the
creation of fake profiles, and the hiring of Creative Computing employees to gain unauthorized access to Creative Computing’s website. Id. The case was before the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals because Getloaded was appealing the entry of a permanent injunction
against its access to Creative Computing’s website. Id.
61. Id. “ ‘Loss’ is defined in the new version as ‘any reasonable cost to any victim, including the cost of responding to an offense, conducting a damage assessment, and restoring the data. . .and any revenue lost, cost incurred, or other consequential damages
incurred because of the interruption of service.’ ” Id.
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ble cost associated with the damage done by the defendant.62 Losses and
damages must meet the statutory minimum of $5,000, but need not be
shown for each intrusion into the protected computer but can be aggregated over the course of one year.63 The legislative history clearly states
that Congress intended the term “loss” to target expenses undertaken by
the victim to correct indirect damage incurred as a result of a hacker.64
Although a victim’s systems may not be physically damaged, the fact
that outside consultants had to be hired to fix the intrusions by hackers
does not mean that the victim did not suffer loss as defined by the statute.65 However, both loss and damage are required in order to recover
under the CFAA.66
H. COURT INTERPRETATION

OF THE

CFAA

Courts have struggled to determine what is considered loss and
what accounts for damages under the CFAA. The Ninth Circuit has included damages under the CFAA to mean a measurable loss of data,
steps taken to restore that data, or costs associated with re-securing the
data.67 Additionally, a plaintiff can determine the amount of loss for
damages to include costs incurred to restore programs, systems, and
data that the defendant may have damaged.68
Judge Thad Heartfield, a federal judge sitting in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, has held that, absent a
substantive violation, plaintiffs are barred from recovery.69 In this case,
the court accepted the Department of Justice’s (“DOJ”) interpretation of
the CFAA and included it in determining what constitutes damage under
the CFAA, holding that $5,000 in damage must be done to an individual
62. ResDev, LLC v. Lot Builders Ass’n, Inc., No. 6:04-cv-1374-Orl-31DAB, 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 19099 at *16 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 10, 2005).
63. See Fiber Sys. Int’l v. Roehrs, 470 F.3d 1150, 1157 (5th Cir. 2006).
64. EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 585 (1st Cir. 2001). “Congress intended the term ‘loss’ to target remedial expenses borne by the victims that could
not properly be considered direct damages caused by a computer hacker.” Id. (citing In re
Doubleclick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 521 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)).
65. See Explorica, 274 F.3d at 584-85.
66. Thurmond v. Compaq Computer Corp., 171 F. Supp. 2d 667, 678 (E.D. Tex. 2001).
“Nowhere in the plain language of 18 U.S.C. Section 1030(g) is ‘loss’ defined as an alternative to showing a substantive violation of the CFAA. The statute expressly mandates ‘loss
by reason of a violation.’ ” Id.
67. United States v. Middleton, 231 F.3d 1207, 1213 (9th Cir. 2000). The criminal defendant was convicted of illegally accessing e-mail accounts of Slip.net’s employees after he
was let go as an employee. Id. at 1208. He deleted accounts and created new accounts. Id.
at 1209. He unsuccessfully argued on appeal that the trial court incorrectly instructed the
jury on the definition of damage under the CFAA. Id. at 1213.
68. Id. at 1213.
69. Thurmond, 171 F. Supp. 2d at 675.
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computer and cannot be spread across a series of computers.70 Additionally, the Northern District of Illinois explicitly stated that a cause of action can only be brought if damage and loss is affirmatively plead.71
Courts seem to be split on whether civil plaintiffs must allege damage in order to state a claim under the Act.72 The United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit said that “[f]ew courts have endeavored to
resolve the contours of damage and loss under the CFAA.”73 Some
courts, like the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, have held that damages are required in order to state a claim under the CFAA.74 For example, the Seventh Circuit stated that installing a program that was
intended to delete files is a sufficient showing of damages under the
CFAA.75 The court implied that no actual physical damage needed to be
done to the computer, but the simple act of deleting programs and
software was enough to constitute damages under the CFAA.76 Judge
Terrence F. McVerry, sitting in the Western District of Pennsylvania,
ruled that a plaintiff could maintain a cause of action under the CFAA
because the hiring of an outside consultant to analyze the company’s
computer systems exceeded the jurisdictional amount of $5,000.77 The
implication under this scenario is that loss could be further defined as
hiring a specialist to determine what sensitive data could have been
70. Id. at 680-81 (citing Cybercrime: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Justice and State; Judiciary and Related Agencies of the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 106th
Cong. 13 (2000) (Statement of Janet Reno Attorney General of the United States)).
71. Garelli Wong & Assoc., Inc. v. Nichols, 551 F. Supp. 2d 704, 708 (N.D. Ill. 2008). “A
thorough reading of the [act] shows that it is necessary for a plaintiff to plead both damage
and loss in order to properly allege a civil CFAA violation.” Id.
72. See, e.g., Kathrein v. McGrath, 166 Fed. Appx. 858, 863 n. 2 (7th Cir. 2006) (stating “[a] violation can occur, however, only where there is damage to a ‘protected computer’”); Int’l Airport Centers L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 419 (7th Cir. 2006) (stating
“damage” includes “any impairment to the integrity or availability of data, a program, a
system or information”).
73. EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 584 (1st Cir. 2001) (noting
only two district courts have directly addressed the issue of damages under the CFAA).
74. See Kathrein, 166 Fed. Appx. at 863. In Kathrien, Michael Kathrien created a
website about his ex-wife’s new husband, Michael Monor that depicted him in various sexual and pornographic situations. Id. at 859. In its decision on other various unrelated
claims, the Court stated in a footnote that a violation of the CFAA can only occur where
there is damage to a protected computer. See Id. at 863 n.2.
75. Citrin, 440 F.3d at 419. The court stated:
we don’t see what the difference the precise mode of transmission can make. In
either the Internet download or the disk insertion, a program intended to cause
damage, not to the physical computer, of course, but to its files—but “damage”
includes “any impairment to the integrity or availability of data, a program, a system or information.” Id.
76. Id.
77. Hudson Global Res. Holdings, Inc. v. Hill, No. 02:07cv 132, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14840, at *5-6 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 2, 2007).
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damaged, as well as the costs associated with upgrading security
features.
In contrast, some courts have taken a narrower approach to loss and
damages under the CFAA.78 In a case from the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals, a company claimed that the defendant’s violation of the CFAA
caused $10 million in damage.79 Under the Act, the Second Circuit explained that lost revenue is different from costs incurred from an “interruption of service.”80 Additionally, the Second Circuit held, citing to a
Southern District of New York case, that a loss of good will and business
could not be used to calculate loss and damages unless it resulted directly from the impairment of a computer system.81 On appeal the Second Circuit upheld the district court’s ruling that travel expenses
incurred as a result of traveling to respond to a computer offense cannot
be used to calculate loss under the CFAA.82
When calculating compensatory damages under the CFAA, a plaintiff is not entitled to investigator’s fees simply because they are a natural
and foreseeable result of damage done by a defendant.83 Any loss not
associated with computer impairment or computer damage is barred
from monetary recovery.84 A civil litigant can include costs of investigating the amount of damage done to a computer system in the loss analysis, but cannot include investigating costs that are incurred in a search
for who might have actually hacked the computer system.85
I. THURMOND

ET AL V.

COMPAQ COMPUTER CORP.

In Thurmond v. Compaq Computer Corp., the court ruled that damages could not be aggregated among prospective class members to meet
the $5,000 threshold.86 Damages could not be aggregated because the
78. See, e.g., Nexan Wires S.A. v. Sark-USA, Inc., 166 Fed. Appx. 559, 561 (2d Cir.
2006).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 562.
81. Id. (citing Register.com Inc. v. Verio, Inc, 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 252 n.12 (S.D.N.Y.
2000)).
82. Nexan Wires S.A. v. Sark-USA, Inc., 319, F. Supp. 2d 468, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2004),
aff’d, 166 Fed. Appx. 559 (2d Cir. 2006).
83. Tyco Int’l (U.S.) Inc. v. John Does 1-3, No. 01 Civ. 3856, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11800, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 11, 2003).
84. Civic Ctr. Motors, L.T.D. v. Mason St. Imp. Cars, L.T.D., 387 F. Supp. 2d 278, 382
(S.D.N.Y. 2005).
85. Tyco Int’l, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11800 at *5. “Although the court in Middleton,
uses the word ‘investigating,’ it is clear from both the court’s language (‘investigating. . .the
damage’) and the facts of the case that this investigation involved only assessing the damage to the system-not locating and collecting information about the hacker.” Id.
86. Thurmond v. Compaq Computer Corp., 171 F. Supp. 2d. 667, 680 (E.D. Tex. 2001);
see also LaBelle, supra note 27, at 103.
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statute requires that the damage must be done to a “protected computer”
meaning one computer, not many.87 The Thurmond court cited the congressional testimony given by Justice Department officials, including the
then Attorney General Janet Reno and Deputy Attorney General Eric
Holder.88 Both testified before various committees that were considering
amendments to the CFAA. Relying heavily on the testimony offered by
Justice Department officials, the Thurmond court reached the conclusion
that if Congress had wanted to allow for an aggregation of damages
across multiple computers, it would have specifically written language
into the statute that would have permitted it.89
J. IN RE DOUBLECLICK INC. PRIVACY LITIGATION
In Doubleclick, the Court reached the conclusion that damages could
only be aggregated across victims for a single act by the defendant.90
However, the court reached its decision on a different analysis of the
statute.91 The Doubleclick court looked to the legislative history to conclude that Congress only used the singular form of certain words in the
statute and that this decision meant only a single act could be used to
determine that “losses caused by the same act may be aggregated for the
purposes of meeting the . . threshold.”92 Thus, the court ruled that the
accessing of data on millions of computers, in potential violation of the
CFAA, could not constitute a single act under the statute.93
K. IN RE AMERICA ONLINE, INC. VERSION 5.0 SOFTWARE LITIGATION
In America Online, the court was highly critical of the results
reached in both Thurmond and Doubleclick pertaining to the analysis
87. Thurmond, 171 F. Supp. 2d. at 680; see also LaBelle, supra note 27, at 104.
88. Thurmond, 171 F. Supp. 2d. at 680-81. “The Justice Department’s understanding
of the statute suggests “damage” must be to an individual computer.” Id. (interpreting
Cybercrime: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Justice and State; Judiciary and
Related Agencies of the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 106th Cong. 13 (2000) (Statement of
Janet Reno Attorney General of the United States) and Internet Denial of Service Attacks
and the Federal Response: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice Oversight of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 106th Cong. 95 (2000) (Testimony of Eric Holder, Esq., United States Deputy
Attorney General, Dept. of Justice)).
89. Thurmond, 171 F. Supp. 2d. at 681. “If Congress intended otherwise, it would have
provided for either transmission ‘to a protected computers;’ or the transmission to all “protected computers.’ ” Id.
90. See In re Doubleclick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
91. LaBelle, supra note 27, at 105.
92. Doubleclick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 524 (citing S. R. NO. 99-432, at 2483 (1986)). The
court went on to explain that “[t]he prohibition is phrased in the singular: “[whoever] intentionally accesses a computer without authorization. . .and thereby obtains. . .information
from any protected computer.” Id.
93. Id.

\\server05\productn\S\SFT\27-2\SFT204.txt

2009]

unknown

Seq: 13

COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT

1-JUL-10

9:39

291

regarding damages.94 Judge Alan Gold stated that the courts in Thurmond and Doubleclick did not properly analyze the term “protected computer” in regard to the CFAA.95 Additionally, Judge Gold reasoned that
the Thurmond court did not properly apply legislative history.96 Judge
Gold stated that instead of looking to the legislative history as the Thurmond court purported to do, the court instead cited a comment by then
Attorney General Janet Reno.97 Judge Gold argued that the analysis
offered by the attorney general was not a strong indication of what Congress intended when it adopted the CFAA.98 In sum, Judge Gold stated
that the conclusions reached by the Thurmond and Doubleclick courts
would lead to absurd results when a litigant was pursuing a civil action
under the CFAA.99
III. ANALYSIS
A. STATUTORY

ANALYSIS

Key to this comment are principles of statutory analysis. How
courts analyze a statute becomes particularly important when certain
provisions are ambiguous. The cases discussed suggest that the first
step in a statutory analysis is to determine whether the language at issue has a “plain and unambiguous meaning” within the terms of the dis94. See In re Am. Online, Inc. Version 5.0 Software Litig., 168 F. Supp. 2d 1359, 1373
(S.D. Fla. 2001) (refusing to adopt the reasoning of Thurmond and Doubleclick courts).
95. Id. “Most importantly, in Thurmond and Doubleclick, the courts found the statutory language to be clear, ignored the comma that precedes “to a protected computer,” and
overlooked the fact that the phrase was a dangling participle.” Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. The court stated that Attorney General Janet Reno’s statements “are not a
reliable indication of what both Houses of Congress intended when they adopted the
[CFAA]). Id. Attorney General Janet Reno stated, “we may need to strengthen the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act by closing a loophole that allows computer hacker who have
cause a large amount of damage to a network of computers to escape punishment if no
individual computer sustained over $5,000 worth of damage.” Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1374. The court held:
[the Thurmond and Doubleclick courts’ interpretation] of the [CFAA] would lead to
the absurd result that a party who accesses one computer without authorization,
and thereby causes $5,000 worth of damage to that one computer, would be guilty
of violating the CFAA and, therefore, civilly liable. On the other band, a party who
accesses millions of computers and causes only $100 worth of damage to each computer would not be guilty of violating the CFAA. Id.
See also LaBelle, supra note 27, at 104. The result would be absurd because if a
party accessed a computer without authorization and caused $5,000 worth of damage to one computer they would be civilly liable. Id. However, if a party access
millions of computers and does only $100 worth of damage no violation of the
CFAA would be present. Id.
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pute.100 If the statute is ambiguous, the courts will proceed to the next
step of statutory analysis.101 Generally, if a court finds that a term is
ambiguous, it will look outside the four corners of the statute to other
sources, such as the legislative history and other outside materials to
determine what Congress intended.102 Despite similar facts and the
same principles of statutory construction, several courts have reached
vastly different results when interpreting the CFAA.103
B. AMBIGUITIES

ARE PRESENT IN THE

CFAA

The damage requirement section of the CFAA contains ambiguous
statutory language.104 The court in America Online pointed out an issue
with a dangling participle in the language and how it has caused confusion.105 The Supreme Court has noted that a dangling participle can be
particularly troubling in statutory language.106 The court in America
Online notes how this deficiency creates uncertainty under the CFAA.107
The language in the CFAA is unclear as to whether a defendant must
knowingly cause a transmission of a program or whether a defendant
must intentionally cause damage.108 Ambiguity is present in the damages language of the CFAA as to what a plaintiff is required to show in
order to establish that a computer has been damaged.
The Supreme Court has ruled that when a statute is ambiguous, a
court may turn to the legislative history to determine the legislature’s
100. See ResDev, LLC v. Lot Builders Ass’n, Inc., No. 6:04-cv-1374-Orl-3 1DAB, 2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19099 at *3 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 10, 2005); see also In re Doubleclick Inc.
Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 520 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); see also In re Am. Online, Inc.
Version 5.0 Software Litig., 168 F. Supp. 2d 1359, 1369 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (stating “[a] court
must assume that Congress used the words in the a statute as they are commonly and
ordinarily understood, and if the statutory language is clear, no further inquiry is necessary.”); see also Thurmond v. Compaq Computer Corp., 171 F. Supp. 2d. 667, 677 (E.D. Tex.
2001) (stating “[t]o interpret statutory terms, the Court looks first looks to the plain language of the statute, examining, ‘the statute as a whole, including its design, object, and
policy’”) (citing New York Life Ins. Co. v. Deshotel, 142 F.3d 873, 885 (5th Cir.1998)).
101. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340-41 (1997).
102. Am. Online, 168 F. Supp. 2d at 1369. “If the statutory language is ambiguous, a
court may examine extrinsic materials, including legislative history, to determine Congressional intent.” Id.; see also Doubleclick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 520; see also ResDev, 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 19099 at *3.
103. Compare Am. Online, 168 F. Supp. 2d 1359 with Doubleclick, 154 F. Supp. 2d 497.
104. Am. Online, 168 F. Supp. 2d at 1372 (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5(A) (2008)).
105. Id. (explaining that the language of the § 1030(a)(5) is particularly troubling because it leaves open for interpretation that damages could or could not be aggregated
across multiple computers).
106. Young v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974, 980-81 (1986) (stating “[a]s enemies
of the dangling participle well know, the English language does not always force a writer to
specify which of two possible objects is the one to which a modifying phrase relates”).
107. Am. Online, 168 F. Supp. 2d at 1372.
108. Id.
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intent.109 However, relying solely on the testimony of justice department officials is not the best approach to ascertain Congressional intent
in the CFAA.110 The court in Thurmond incorrectly relied on the Attorney General’s statements to conclude that damages cannot be aggregated across multiple computers.111 Conversely, the court in America
Online correctly relied on a Senate report that was released in conjunction with the original CFAA in 1986.112 Senate Report 99-474 stated
that certain malicious acts may cause less than the statutory threshold,
but according to the specific language in the statute, the committee made
clear that the same actions that caused the losses resulting from the
same act may be aggregated to reach the damage minimum.113
C. LEGISLATIVE

HISTORY OF THE

CFAA

Several key Senate reports have addressed the legislative intent of
the CFAA’s provisions. From the legislative history, it is evident that
Congress has been concerned with keeping the CFAA up to date with
advancements in technology. As computer criminals have become more
sophisticated in their deviant actions, the legislature must constantly
change the law to stay in line with technological advancements.114 Congress has been cognizant that ambiguities have existed in the CFAA,
which is why the amendments have attempted to clarify some of those
ambiguities.115
With the advent and development of the Internet, Congress likely
would intend for the statute to allow for the aggregation of damages
across multiple computers and computer systems. Senator Humphrey
109. Young, 106 S. Ct. at 979-81 (1986). The use of a dangling participle does create
ambiguity in the CFAA. Thus, court should use legislative history to interpret the CFAA.
110. See In re Am. Online, Inc. Version 5.0 Software Litig., 168 F. Supp. 2d 1359, 1373
(S.D. Fla. 2001) (explaining the Attorney General’s statements “are not a reliable indication of what both Houses of Congress intended when they adopted the statutory language
in question”).
111. Thurmond v. Compaq Computer Corp., 171 F. Supp. 2d. 667, 680-681 (E.D. Tex.
2001).
112. Am. Online, 168 F. Supp. 2d at 1373. “In fact, the predecessor versions of the
CFAA make it clear that damage is to be measured as it stems from one act, not a single
computer, and thereby affects several individuals.” Id. (discussing S. REP. NO. 99-474, at
2483 (1986)).
113. S. REP. NO. 99-474, at 2483 (1986).
Certain types of malicious mischief may cause smaller amounts of damage to numerous individuals, and thereby collectively create a loss of more than $1,000
[original damage amount]. By using “one or more others,” the Committee intends
to make clear that losses caused by the same act may be aggregated for the purposes of meeting the. . .threshold. Id.
114. S. REP. NO. 101-544, at 4 (1990). “A primary focus of the legislation is to avoid the
complications and ambiguities created by certain language in the current CFAA.” Id.
115. Id. at 5.
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noted, “[i]t is important that we update our computer crime laws to stay
abreast of the rapid changes in computer abuse technologies.”116 As
technology has progressed, Congress has attempted to keep up with the
advancements through the various amendments to the CFAA.117
Amendments have specifically addressed issues pertaining to newly discovered forms of malicious computer use.118 Some forms of malicious
computer use that the amendments to the CFAA have addressed include
destructive worms and viruses that could be released and cause damage
to a computer network.119 Congress has consistently intended for the
CFAA to be a pertinent tool for law enforcement and civil litigants in
prosecuting malicious computer use.
From the legislative history attached to the CFAA, it is clear that
Congress has used the CFAA to properly protect computers users from
those who wish to exploit technology. For instance, included in a discussion of the 1996 amendments to the CFAA, Congress broadened “damages” to include damage to computer systems both from insiders and
outsiders who intentionally damage a computer system.120
D. COURT

RELIANCE ON LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

The Shurgard court properly applied the legislative history of the
CFAA when it denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss, based in part,
on the claim that the CFAA was intended only to apply to industry computers that, if damaged, could affect the public’s privacy interests.121
The court noted that the defendant’s analysis of the legislative history
was incorrect.122 The court stated that, although sections of the act supported both the plaintiff and the defendant, the history supporting the
plaintiff’s analysis was far more convincing.123 The Shurgard court, in
reading the legislative history, broadly applied the CFAA. In doing so,
the Court understood that Congress intended for the CFAA to adapt to
the changes in computer technology and infrastructure. The Shurgard
court explained that the scope of the CFAA extends to suits involving
alleged wrongful conduct between two individual companies where the
116. Id. at 4.
117. Id. “In response to changes in computer technology and the threat posed by new
techniques for creating and transmitting malicious programs and codes,” amendments, to
the CFAA were proposed in 1990. Id.
118. Id. at 2. “The legislation amends the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, 18
U.S.C. 1030, to strengthen and clarify the application of Federal law to newly discovered
forms of computer abuse.” Id.
119. See Id. at 2.
120. S. REP. NO. 104-357, at 9 (1996).
121. Shurgard Storage Centers Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121,
1127 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1128.
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information wrongfully obtained may not extend to the public at
large.124 This court’s analysis takes a broad view of the CFAA, and in
doing so, correctly construes Congress’s intent for the statute as an effective means to fight damage to computer systems.
In ResDev v. Lot Builders, the court was highly critical of the conclusion that was reached in Shurgard.125 The ResDev court argued that the
Shurgard court’s application of legislative history was incorrect and
stretched the meaning of the statute too far.126 As stated earlier, the
CFAA is ambiguous in regards to damages and the types of computers
and computer systems that the CFAA protects.127 The court in ResDev
was highly critical of legislative history, but legislative history shows
Congress’ intent clearer than the sources on which the court relied.128
The ResDev court turned to, among other sources, Black’s Law Dictionary and Eleventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions, to help it determine
the meaning of words within the CFAA.129 While both of these are reputable sources, they do not reflect the intent of Congress.
ResDev court’s criticism is unfounded because a court should examine the legislative history if the language of the statute is not clear.
The court in ResDev should have turned to the legislative history instead
of other sources to determine the intended meaning of the CFAA. The
ResDev court would have benefited from looking at the legislative history
of the CFAA to help it determine Congress’s intent for the CFAA. The
ResDev court was highly critical of the use of legislative history in general.130 The ResDev court stated that legislative history should be only
used if the language of the statute produces a ridiculous result.131

124. Id. The court noted that the legislative history suggests a “broad reading” of the
terms “protected computer” and “without authorization.” Id. 1129. The court determined
that someone who violates the CFAA could be liable if intellectual property rights are involved as well as someone who wrongfully accessed a computer for commercial gain. Id.
125. ResDev, LLC v. Lot Builders Ass’n, Inc., No. 6:04-cv-1374-Orl-3 1DAB, 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 19099 at *13 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 10, 2005).
126. Id. (stating “[a]nother thing that detracts from Shurgard is its heavy reliance on
legislative history”).
127. See In re Am. Online, Inc. Version 5.0 Software Litig., 168 F. Supp. 2d 1359, 1372
(S.D. Fla. 2001).
128. ResDev, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19099 at *8.
129. Id. The court used Black’s Law Dictionary in an attempt to help the court define
“loss” and “damages.” Id. at 10-11. Then the Court turned to the Eleventh Circuit Pattern
Jury instructions in an attempt to help define “economic damages.” Id. at *9-10.
130. Id. at *3.
131. Id. “[A] court should resort to extrinsic materials, such as legislative history, only
if the statutory language produces a clearly absurd result or presents substantial ambiguity.” Id. at *6.
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OF DAMAGES

There is a split among the federal courts as to whether a litigant
may aggregate damages and to what extent a litigant can aggregate
damages in a potential lawsuit under the CFAA.132 This split leads to a
lack of clarity as to whether a plaintiff can aggregate damages. Few
courts have attempted to resolve the ambiguous language in the CFAA
regarding whether damages can be aggregated, as well as what actually
constitutes damage under the statute.133 Adding to the ambiguity are
the Justice Department’s analysis and interpretation of portions of the
Act.134
In America Online, the court noted that the analysis offered by the
attorney general and the deputy attorney general may contradict the
language of the statute.135 Additionally, Congress’ legislative history is
more convincing about its intent than the interpretation of the statute
offered by DOJ officials. Like nearly every stakeholder involved within
the legislation, the DOJ has an agenda when it offers its comments and
opinions on legislation. While the DOJ’s analysis could be persuasive, it
should not be mistaken as Congress’ intent in regards to a certain statute, like the CFAA. Litigants should be allowed to aggregate damages
because Congress has clearly intended that the CFAA should be able to
adapt along with fast growing computer technology.136 As a result of
these analyses, it is clear that plaintiffs who bring suit under the CFAA
should be allowed to aggregate the $5,000 damage threshold across multiple computers. Additionally, litigants should be able to rely on a liberal
construction of the term “damage” because Congress has intended the
CFAA to be an effective tool in fighting malicious computer activity.
In Creative Computing v. Getloaded.com, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals initially looked to the legislative history of the CFAA, but then
ultimately dismissed the suit, instead, turning on what it deemed to be
the clear language of the statute.137 However, in its decision, the court
analyzed a portion of the legislative history pertaining to the aggregation
132. LaBelle, supra note 27, at 104.
133. See EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577 (1st Cir. 2001).
134. See In re Am. Online, Inc. Version 5.0 Software Litig., 168 F. Supp. 2d 1359 (S.D.
Fla. 2001). Certain Justice Department officials offered Congressional testimony that may
contradict the language of the CFAA.
135. See Id. at 1373.
136. See generally S. REP. NO. 104-357 (1996); S. REP. NO. 101-544 (1990).
137. Creative Computing v. Getloaded L.L.C., 386 F. 3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2004). “It
makes no sense to parse the ambiguous legislative history as though it were law. The
preferable way to resolve linguistic ambiguity is to evaluate the alternative readings in
light of the purpose of the statute.” Id.
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of damages under the Act.138 The Court noted that the language in the
legislative history pertaining to the aggregation of damages was permissive, not restrictive.139 Here, the Creative Computing court correctly
turned to the legislative history. In doing so, the court broadly construed
the statute by determining that the aggregation of damages was permissive. The court was taking into account Congress’s intent that the statute be flexible to handle changes in technology and computer systems.
Thus, according to the Ninth Circuit in its interpretation of the legislative history, the aggregation of damages across a one year period is
allowed.
F. RESTRICTIVE

INTERPRETATIONS OF THE

CFAA

In Nexan Wires S.A. et al v. Sark-USA, Inc., the Southern District of
New York court adopted a much narrower reading of the term “loss” as
pertaining to the damage analysis under the CFAA.140 In granting the
defendant’s summary judgment motion, the court noted that lost revenue not related to the interruption of a computer service could not be
used by a plaintiff to determine the $5,000 damage threshold.141 The
court held that the loss must be tied directly to the interruption or impairment of a computer system.142 In affirming the decision, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals noted that because there was no interruption of
services, the plaintiff could not assert their losses under the CFAA.143
The statutory definition of loss should be expanded slightly from the
Nexan Wires court’s interpretation. If a hacker is able to steal business
documents and use them for profit, it could be reasoned that the victim
has lost revenue as a result of the hacker’s malicious activity. Simply
because there is no interruption of service, does not automatically mean
that the victim has not suffered a loss. The terms “damage” and “loss”
under the CFAA should be construed liberally, so that when a hacker
designs a new way to damage a computer, a potential victim will have
the ability to fight back effectively. Additionally, Congress has consistently stated that it wants the CFAA to stay abreast of the technology so
that the Act remains an effective tool to for victims.
In Tyco International v. John Does 1-3, the Southern District of New
138. Id. The portion analyzed by the court was “the Committee intends to make clear
that losses caused by the same act may be aggregated for the purposes of meeting
the. . .threshold.” Id.
139. Id. “The obvious purpose of this remark was permissive, to allow aggregation to
meet the $5,000 floor, as when one intrusion causes one expense after another for months.”
Id.
140. See Nexan Wires S.A. v. Sark-USA, Inc., 319, F. Supp. 2d 468, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
141. See Id.
142. See Id. at 477.
143. Nexan Wires S.A. v. Sark-USA, Inc., 166 Fed. Appx. 559, 561 (2d Cir. 2006).
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York took a restrictive view of damages.144 The court did not turn to
principles of statutory analysis and relied solely on the plain language of
the statute.145 The court noted that while the CFAA allows for recovery
of losses beyond physical damage, that damages above and beyond physical damages have been restricted by other courts.146 The Tyco court
reached the conclusion that a plaintiff could not include in its damage
claim money spent attempting to locate who hacked its system.147 The
Tyco court did not turn to the legislative history because the court found
that the language was clear. Even though the Tyco court did not turn to
legislative history to reach its decision, the court did rely on another
court’s decision that incorrectly applied the legislative history of the
CFAA, which led to a decision that took a restrictive view of damages
under the statute.148
The Tyco court analysis is a far too restrictive interpretation of the
CFAA. Damages need to be construed liberally in order for the statute to
be effective. Furthermore, it is not too difficult to reason that money
spent on attempting to locate a hacker could be used in the damage assessment, because the hacker could repeatedly access a computer system, which could lead to continued and repeated loss and damage to a
system. If the hacker is found, the unauthorized access would be halted.
G. SAME

HISTORY, DIFFERENT OUTCOMES

In Register.com Inc. v. Verio, Second Circuit Court Judge Fred
Parker, in a published draft opinion, held that the plaintiff would not be
able to reach the $5,000 damage threshold.149 The plaintiff alleged that
the defendant’s actions consistently slowed its response time to its customers.150 Circuit Judge Parker relied on the reasoning reached by the
Shurgard court.151 In using the statutory and legislative analysis found
in Shurgard, Judge Parker reached the conclusion that merely because
the plaintiff’s system was slowed, this did not show enough damage to
prove that the plaintiff could meet the $5,000 damage threshold that the
144. See Tyco Int’l (US) Inc. v. John Does 1-3, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11800 (S.D.N.Y.
July 11, 2003). In Tyco, the plaintiff was looking to recover damages for attempting to
track down the person responsible for hacking their computer system. Id. at *2.
145. See Id.
146. Id. at *4 (stating, “[d]amages awarded by courts under the Act have generally been
limited to those costs necessary to assess the damage caused to the plaintiff’s computer
system or to resecure the system in the wake of a hacking”).
147. See Id.
148. In re Doubleclick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 521 (S.D. N.Y. 2001).
149. See Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 438 (2d Cir. 2004).
150. See Id.
151. See Id. Circuit Judge Parker relied heavily on the reasoning found in Shurgard.
Id. at 439-40. He said of Shurgard, the statutory analysis is “excellent” and the opinion
conducts a “thorough search” of the legislative history. Id.
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CFAA requires.152 The draft opinion in Register.com is an excellent example of how two different courts can use the same legislative history
and the same general ideas of statutory construction to reach two differing views. Further, it illustrates why Congress needs to amend the
CFAA to eliminate the ambiguities and to continue to keep the statute
relevant as technology progresses.
In EF Cultural Travel v. Explorica, the First Circuit Court of Appeals, after conducting a statutory analysis, reached the conclusion that
the plaintiffs would most likely succeed on the merits of their CFAA
claim and thus were entitled a preliminary injunction.153 In doing so,
the court adopted a broad reading of the term “damage.”154 The court
concluded that the absence of actual physical damage did not mean that
the plaintiff did not suffer damages under the meaning of the CFAA.155
The court noted that to read the CFAA differently would impair the
scope beyond what Congress intended.156 The court in EF Cultural
Travel relied on language in Senate Report 104-357 to reach the conclusion that damages could extend to expenses that the plaintiff incurred
that could not be considered direct damage that occurred as a result of
the violation.157 The EF Cultural Travel court understands that a broad
reading of the CFAA is needed in order to properly protect networks and
computer systems. In using legislative history, the EF Cultural Travel
court read a broad view of the CFAA that will allow for its adaptation as
technology develops.
Judge Naomi R. Buchwald, sitting in the Southern District of New
York, ruled in Doubleclick that the plaintiffs could only aggregate damages for a single act by the defendant.158 In that decision, Judge Buchwald relied on the legislative history of the CFAA to reach her
conclusion.159 The Doubleclick court reasoned that the CFAA is ambiguous as to whether “loss” under the CFAA is subject to the $5,000 threshold.160 The court adopted a restrictive interpretation of Section
152. See Id.
153. EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F. 3d 577, 585 (1st Cir. 2001).
154. Id.
155. Id. (stating “[t]hat the physical components were not damaged is fortunate, but it
does not lessen the loss represented by consultant fees”).
156. Id. (stating, “[i]f we were to restrict the statute. . .we would flout Congress’s intent
by effectively permitting the CFAA to languish in the twentieth century, as violators of the
Act move in to the twenty-first century and beyond”).
157. Id. (stating the “legislative history makes clear that Congress intended the term
‘loss’ to target remedial expenses borne by victims that could not properly be considered
direct damage caused by a computer hacker”).
158. See generally LaBelle, supra note 27; In re Doubleclick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F.
Supp. 2d 497, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
159. See Doubleclick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 522.
160. Id. at 521.
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1030(a)(2)(C), inferring that the singular language used in the statute
means that the damage threshold needs to be met in one singular act.161
The America Online court was highly critical of the Doubleclick
court’s damage analysis.162 The court in America Online noted that the
Doubleclick court glossed over the deficiencies and ambiguities located in
the CFAA.163 The America Online court decided that the legislative history dictates that the damage threshold should be measured from one
act, which can affect many different computers.164
The America Online court correctly understood the legislative intent
of the CFAA. The court read the damage provisions broadly to reach the
conclusion that a litigant should be able to aggregate damages of a single
act across multiple computer systems.165 Congress intended that the
CFAA would be adaptable to change with advances in technology, such
as the ability to connect multiple computers together, which would allow
for single act to damage multiple machines.166
H. CONGRESS

SHOULD AMEND THE

CFAA

In order to remedy the ambiguities present in the CFAA, Congress
must amend the Act in order to clarify the provisions relating to what
constitutes damage. By stating that the CFAA was meant to further protect “computer systems,” it could be reasonably inferred that Congress
intended to protect against damage caused by one individual that could
occur across multiple computers.167 After analyzing the legislative history as well as the amendments to the CFAA, it is clear that Congress
intended the statute to be flexible in the ever advancing area of computer
systems and technology.168 In today’s business world, computers are
linked together in networks.169 Computer networks provide companies
with an efficient way to do business. However, because networks link
many computers together, it is important that the CFAA be adaptable to
the possibility that more than one computer on a network could be af161. Id. at 524.
162. In re Am. Online, Inc. Version 5.0 Software Litig., 168 F. Supp. 2d 1359, 1373 (S.D.
Fla. 2001).
163. Id. at 1372. “Most importantly, in. . .Doubleclick, the [court] found the statutory
language to be clear, ignored the comma that precedes ‘to a protected computer,’ and overlooked the fact that the phrase was a dangling participle.” Id. at 1373.
164. Id. at 1372.
165. See Id. at 1373-74.
166. See S. REP. NO. 101-544 (1990); S. REP. NO. 104-357 (1996).
167. See S. REP. NO. 104-357, at 8 (1996).
168. See Id.; S. REP. NO. 101-544 (1990).
169. See 71 AM. JUR. TRIALS 111 § 24 (2009). “Computer links and local area networks
(LANs) are the means by which computers talk to each other. Local area networks are the
means by which computers talk to each other.” Id.
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fected by a malicious attack.170 Based on the analysis of the policy and
legislative history of the CFAA, the ability to aggregate damages across
multiple computers should be allowed with the advancement of multiple
computers linked together in networks. Congress intended that the
CFAA would be a powerful tool for civil litigants to protect their expansive and expensive computer systems from those who wish to do them
harm.
IV. PROPOSAL
Congress should amend the CFAA to make clear that litigants
should be able to aggregate damages across multiple potential victims
and across multiple computers. The legislation should read:
Damage or loss to a protected computer may be aggregated across
multiple computer systems or networks. The damage or loss must occur
over a one year period and must reach a minimum of $5,000. The language of this section is not meant to limit the number of computer systems or users that can be used to aggregate damages.
The term “loss” can be construed to mean, but is not limited to,
reasonable costs associated with discovering a violation or violations of
subclasses (I), (II), (III), (IV), or (V) of subsection (c)(4)(A)(i), lost revenue directly associated with a violation of subclasses (I), (II), (III), (IV),
or (V) of subsection (c)(4)(A)(i), and any other reasonable cost associated with a violation of subclasses (I), (II), (III), (IV), or (V) of subsection
(c)(4)(A)(i).
Section 1030(a)(5) shall be amended to read: knowingly causes the
transmission of a program, information, code, or command, and as a
result of such conduct, intentionally causes damage without authorization, to a protected computer or protected computers. Nothing in this
section should be read to construe a limitation on the number of protected computers that need to be damaged without authorization.

V. CONCLUSION
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act is a federal statute designed to
be a comprehensive statute to fight cybercrime.171 Congress intended
that as technology progresses, the statute would be able to adequately
protect computer systems from malicious hackers.172 In particular, it
can be very difficult to assess damages in a CFAA claim because there
may be no actual physical damage to a computer or computer system.
The Act’s legislative history has consistently suggested that Congress in170. See Id.
171. See S. REP. NO. 101-544 (1990); S. REP. NO. 104-357 (1996).
172. Id.
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tended the Act to adapt to changes in technology.173 If Congress’ intent
is what the legislative history suggests, then the CFAA should be
amended again to keep up with the ever changing computer crime environment. Litigants need an effective tool to prevent damage and to punish those who cause damage to computer systems.
Congress needs to amend the CFAA by making it clear that damages
can be aggregated across multiple computers and computer systems over
the one year period currently allowed under the statute.174 As court
cases have indicated, the statute is ambiguous and poorly written in
describing how damages may be sought as well as what amount and
which type of damages are required to allow civil litigants recovery
under the CFAA.175 Additionally, the case law demonstrates that it is
not ideal to have courts attempting to analyze ambiguous statutory language.176 Although courts use the same general principles of statutory
construction, the results of that process can vary widely.177 The court
interpretations change further when courts begin to analyze more than
two decades of legislative history.178 Situations arise where courts rely
on testimony and materials that may not truly reflect the intentions of
Congress, but reflect how a government agency has interpreted the
CFAA.179 Congress needs to amend the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
to clarify the damages section of the Act. Congress needs to make clear
that a litigant should be able to aggregate damages to meet the $5,000
threshold required for a federal court to have jurisdiction over a claim.
173. Id.
174. 18 U.S.C. § 1030.
175. See In re Am. Online, Inc. Version 5.0 Software Litig., 168 F. Supp. 2d 1359, 137273 (S.D. Fla. 2001).
176. See ResDev, LLC v. Lot Builders Ass’n, Inc., No. 6:04-cv-1374-Orl-31DAB, 2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19099 at *3 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 10, 2005); see also In re Doubleclick Inc.
Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 520 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); In re Am. Online, Inc. Version 5.0
Software Litig., 168 F. Supp. 2d 1359, 1369 (S.D. Fla. 2001).
177. See ResDev, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19099 at *3; see also Doubleclick, 154 F. Supp.
2d at 520; Am. Online, 168 F. Supp. 2d at 1369; Thurmond v. Compaq Computer Corp., 171
F. Supp. 2d 667, 677 (E.D. Tex. 2001).
178. See e.g., Doubleclick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 522; EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica,
Inc., 274 F. 3d 577, 585 (1st Cir. 2001).
179. Thurmond, 171 F. Supp. 2d. at 680-81 (demonstrating the court’s reliance on the
Justice Department’s interpretations of the CFAA made by the justice department made
that do not accurately reflect Congress’ intentions).

